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We model the information gathering behavior on the acquisition of re-
sources. Our models are optimization problem of expected profit by a variable
of dividing effort to gather information. We carried out mathematical analysis
and consequently attained below understanding. Optimal vaJue of the model
is depends on the efficiency of gathering information and the increments of
payoff by acquiring information. In addition, we discuss the extension of our
models in order to describe many phenomena: the mistake of information,
the multiple choices of strategies, the self belief and so on. These discussions
are the foundation of game theoretical approach of information and the pos-
sibilities of application are in many field: ecology, economics, politics, and
information sciences.
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1. $P$ , $q(p)$ $0\leq p\leq 1$ ,
. ( ,







2 , $q(O)=0$ , $q(1)=1$ .
, $(p=1)$ , $(q(1)<1)$ .
12
, . $q(p)$
, $q’(p)= \frac{dq(p)}{dp}$ . . $q(p)$
$q’(p)\geq 0$ .






$(R>S)$ . , ,
. ,
$q(p)$ . , $q(p)$ , $1-q(p)$
. $E[q(p)]$ ,
$E[q(p)]=Rq(p)+S\{1-q(p)\}=(R-S)q(p)+S$ (3)










, $f(p)$ $P$ 3.
$q(p)$ $0\leq p\leq 1$ ,
$f’(p)= \frac{df(p)}{dp}=0$ (5)
$p=p*$ . ,










. , $f(p)$ $p*$ $P$
, $C$ .
, 2 $p*$ .
3 $f(p)$ . $P$
( , $P$
, $f(p)$ $p$ $[5|$ .
14
(a) I (b) I $E^{J}$
2:
2.2 $R/S$ $p*$




$C$ $B(1, \frac{-S}{R-S})$ . $B$ $y$ $\frac{-S}{R-S}$ , $-F^{1}-1$
. $B$ $R$ $S$ .




, 1. , $R$ $S$ , $\frac{R}{s}$ $\infty$
. 2. , $R$ $S$ , $\frac{R}{s}$ 1






, $R$ $y$ .
$S<R<\infty$ 4 $R$ 5 , $p*$
. ,
, $p*$ $R$ $S$ , . 2
, $B$ $p*$ . , $B$ $p*$
, $p*$ $R$ $S$ , $B$ $y$ (
$R/S$ ) $p*$ .
$B$ $y$ $u$ , $P$ $u=g(p)$ .
$B$ $y$ $\frac{-S}{R-S}$ ,
$\frac{-S}{R-S}=-\frac{1}{\frac{R}{s}-1}=u$ (14)
.
$R>S$ , $u<0$ .




. $u=g(p)$ $P$ ,
$g’(p)=q”(p)(p-1)+2q’(p)$ (17)
.
, $q(p)$ , . I (1) 221 ,
II (2) 222 .
2.2.1 I
$0\leq p\leq 1$ $q(p)$ (concave) $q”(p)<0$ , (17)
1 , 2 $g’(p)>0$. , $g(p)$ $0\leq P\leq 1$
. $g(O)=-q’(0)<,$ $g(1)=q’(1)>0$ . , $0\leq P\leq 1$
, $g(p)=0$ $p=p_{0}$ 1 ( 3).
$,$
$R,$ $S$ $g(p)<0$ , $u=g(p)$ $g(O)\leq g(p)<0$
. , $P$ $p*$ , $p*$
$0\leq p*<p_{0}$ .
, 1. 2. $R/S$ $p*$
.
4 , $S>0$ , $S<0$ .







1. $R$ $S$ ( $R/S$ ) , $g(p)$ . $g(p)$
, $p$, $p*$
, $Po$ ( 3).
2. $R$ $S$ , $p*$ $0<p\leq 1$





, $(p_{0})$ . ,
$R/S$ , $p*=0$ , 2. .
2.2.2 II
$q(p)$ (convex) $q”(p)>0$ . 1 ,
2 . $g(p)$ I
. $g’(p)$ , $g’(p)=0$ $P$ (17) ,
$q”(p)(p-1)+2q’(p)=0$ (19)
. $0\leq p*\leq 1$ $q(p)$ .
$g(p)$ , $g(p)$ , $p*$ I .
17
( Pmin ) 1 , $g(p_{mtn})$ $g(p)$ . I
$Po$ ( 4). $u=g(p)$ $g(p_{\min})\leq g(p)<0$
, $P$ $0\leq p\leq Po$ . , $p*$
$0\leq p*\leq Po$ .
p* 2
( $S$ $R$ P* )
4: II $p*$
1. $R$ $S$ , $g(p)$ . , $g(p_{\min})\leq g(p)\leq g(O)$
, $P$ $p*$ 2 ( 4: ). 2
$p_{high}$ , Plow , $R/S$
, $p_{high}$ \alpha v . $R/S$ Phigh
, Plow . $R/S$ 2
( 4: ).





1. , II 2 .
, 2
. $R$ $S$ ,
2 . I , $p*$
$R/S$ 2. .
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2.3 $q(p)$ :I II
, $R$ $S$ , $p*$








. , $n>0$ . $q(p)$ $n<1$ I , $n>1$
II . , $f(p)$ (4) ,
$f(p)$ $=$ $[(R-S)p^{n}+S](1-p)$ (22)
, $f’(p)$ (7) ,
$f’(p)$ $=$ $-(n+1)(R-S)p^{n}+n(R-S)p^{n-1}-S$ (23)
. , $g(p)$ (16) ,
$g(p)$ $=$ $(n+1)p^{n}-np^{n-1}=p^{n-1}\{(n+1)p-n\}$ (24)
, $g’(p)$ (17) ,
$g’(p)$ $=$ $(n+1)np^{n-1}-n(n-1)p^{n-2}=np^{n-2}\{(n+1)p-(n-1)\}$ (25)
.







. $Rarrow S+$ , $p*$ $0$ .











$g(p_{\min})$ $=$ $-( \frac{n-1}{n+1})^{n-1}$ (30)
. $Po$ 2 , $R/Sarrow\infty$ $p*$ 2
. $(p=0)$ , $p= \frac{n}{n+1}$
. , $g(p_{\min})<p<0$ $R/S$ ,
$p*$ 2 . Pmin , $n$ . $n$
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. , (Charnov,








. $R$ $S$ ,
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, ( ) ,
. $f(p)$ (4) ,
$f(p)$ $=$ $[(R-S)q(p)+S](1-p)$
, $f^{j}(p)$ (7) ,
$f’(p)=(R-S)q’(p)(1-p)-(R-S)q(p)-S$




, $p*$ . ( ,
$q(p)=p^{n}$ , $R,$ $S,$ $n$
.)
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$n=1$ , $q(p)=p$ .
$p*= \frac{R-2S}{2R-2S}$ (35)
. $p*$ $0<p*<1$ ,
. ( .) $R>2S$ $p*>0$
, , $R<2S$ $p*=0$ (
) . $R>0$ $p*<1$ 7.
$n=1/2$
$n=1/2$ , $q(p)=p^{1/2}$ I (1) . (33) ,
,
$\sqrt{p*}=-\frac{S}{3(R-S)}\pm\sqrt{\frac{1}{3}+\frac{S^{2}}{9(R-S)^{2}}}=\frac{-S\pm\sqrt{S^{2}+3(R-S)^{2}}}{3(R-S)}$ (36)
. $p*$ , . $Plow<Ph|gh$
, $P\iota_{\alpha v},$ $p_{high}$ $0<p*<1$ , $R,$ $S$
. , $0<p*$ , $P\iota_{\alpha v}<0$
, $p_{high}>0$ $R>S$ , . ,
$p*<1$ , $Pt\alpha v<0$ . , Phigh $<1$ ,
$R(R-S)>0$ . $R>S$ , $R>0$
\alpha v $<0<p_{high}<1$ , $f(p)$ $p*$ $0<p*<1$
. (33) $n=1/2$ $p^{1/2}$ $-3(R-S)/2<0$ , $f(p)$
(32) $p^{3/2}$ , $p_{lm}$ , Phigh 8.
, $f(p)$ , $p_{h}$
.
$n=2$




. $P \iota_{\alpha v}=\frac{1-\sqrt{\iota-r^{3S}F}}{3}p_{high}=\frac{1+\sqrt{1-3rightarrow-}}{3}$ . $p*$ $0<p*<1$
, . ( .) $0<p*$




, $p_{high}>0$ , $S>0$ $ow>0$ . $p*<1$
, $R>0$ Phigh $<1$ , $Plow< \frac{1}{3}$ $Plow<1$
. , .
, (33) $n=2$ $P^{2}$ $-3(R-S)<0$ , $f(p)$
(32) $p^{3}$ , $P\iota_{\sigma\omega}$ , Phigh . ,
$f(p)$ , $f(O)=S$ $f(p_{htgh})$ .
3.1.2
, . $q(p)$ $\alpha q(p)$
9. , $f(p)$ (4)
,
$f(p)$ $=$ $[(R-S)\alpha q(p)+S](1-p)$ (38)
$l-$ , , $f’(p)$ ,
$f’(p)=(R-S)\alpha q’(p)(1-p)-(R-S)\alpha q(p)-S$ (39)
.
. (21) $q(p)=p^{n}$ , $f(p)$ ,
$f(p)=-(R-S)p^{n+1}+(R-S)p^{n}-Sp+S$ (40)
, $f’(p)=0$ ,
$f’(p)=-(R-S)(n+1)\alpha p^{n}+(R-S)n\alpha p^{n-1}-S=0$ (41)
. , (34) ,
$(n+1)p^{n}-np^{n-1}+ \frac{S}{\alpha(R-S)}=0$ (42)
, $f(p)$ . , $\alpha$
, $p*$ ,
. , $\alpha$ (1 )
. $\alpha$ , ,
$p*$ ,
.
$\mathfrak{g}$ , $q(O)=0$ , $q(1)<1$ .
.









( $n$ ) , $n$ ,
$P$ ,
$J(p)$ $=$ $(J_{1}(p), J_{2}(p),$ $\cdots,$ $J_{n}(p))$ (43)
. $J(p)$ , 2




. $J(p)$ . , $\lrcorner^{dJg_{=}}dp(\frac{dJ_{1}(p)}{dp}\underline{d}J_{2}d$ p4 \ldots\frac{dJ_{n}}{d}p1d)$
, $\forall k$ $\frac{dJ_{k}(p)}{dp}\geq 0$ .
, ,
. , $R$ $S$ ,
$R=(\begin{array}{l}R_{1}R_{2}\vdots R_{n}\end{array})$ , $S=(\begin{array}{l}S_{1}S_{2}\vdots S_{n}\end{array})$ (44)
. $\forall k$ $R_{k}>S_{k}$ .
, $E[p]$ (3)
,
$E[p]$ $=J(p)\cdot R+\{1-J(p)\}\cdot S$ (45)
. , $1=(1,1, \cdots, 1)$ . , $f(p)$
, .
$f(p)=Eb]\{1-p\}$
$=[J(p)\cdot R+\{1-J(p)\}\cdot S](1-p)=[J(p)\cdot(R-S)+S](1-p)$ (46)
, ,
$f(p)$ $=$ $[(J_{1}(p), J_{2}(p),$ $\cdots,$ $J_{n}(p))(\begin{array}{l}R_{1}-S_{l}S_{2}R_{2}-|R_{n}-S_{n}\end{array})+(\begin{array}{l}S_{l}S_{2}|S_{n}\end{array})](1-p)$




, $J(p)$ , 2
. $f(p)$ $P$




1, 2, $\cdots,$ $n$ $J(p)$ $b=(b_{1}, b_{2}, \cdots, b_{n})$
. ( , $\forall k$ $0\leq b_{k}$ , $b_{k}\leq 1$ .
, .)
, $b_{k}$ $J_{k}(p)$ .
$f(p)$ , $J_{k}(p)$ $J_{k}(p)b_{k}$ .
$f(p)$ ,
$f(p)$ $=$ $( \sum_{k=1}^{n}J_{k}(p)b_{k}\{R_{k}-S_{k}\}+\sum_{k=1}^{n}S_{k})(1-p)$ (47)
. , , ,
.
$f(p)=[J(p)diag(b)(R-S)+S](1-p)$ (48)










. , $R,$ $S$ , (44) , $R_{k}>S_{k}$
, $R_{k}\leq S_{k}$ .
, , $J(p)$
, $J_{k}(p)$ $k$ ,
26
. , 1, 2, $\cdots,$ $n$ $J(p)$
$b=(b_{1}, b_{2}, \cdots, b_{n})$ ( , $b$ $0\leq b_{k}\leq 1$








, $L=(L_{1}, L_{2}, \cdots, L_{n})$ . ,
,
$\sum_{k=1}^{n}L_{k}=1$ (49)
. , $J(p)$ . 32 ,
$J(O)=(O, 0, \cdots, 0),$ $J(1)=(1,1, \cdots, 1),$ $J(p)$ ,


















$12$ [$11$ , chap.5] . $[6, 7]$ .
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